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Ernest E. Figart, Jr. *
T HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
survey period are found in judicial decisions. This survey examines
these developments and considers their impact on existing Texas proce-
dure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The most significant development in the area of jurisdiction over the
person was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kulko v.
Superior Court.' The plaintiff, a California resident, commenced an ac-
tion in California against her former husband, who resided in New York,
to obtain an increase in his child support obligation for their two children
who were living with her. Following their marriage during a brief visit to
California in 1959, the plaintiff and defendant lived in New York for
twelve years. During this period two children were born to the marriage,
but in 1972 the. parties separated and the plaintiff moved to California.
Later the same year the plaintiff returned to New York to sign a separation
agreement and immediately thereafter flew to Haiti, where she procured a
divorce; she then returned to California. Thereafter, in accordance with
the separation agreement, the children lived with their father in New York
during the school year and spent their summer vacations with their mother
in California. By the time the action was commenced the situation had
reversed and the children were living in California with their mother dur-
ing the school year and spending their summer vacations in New York
with the defendant.
Upon being served with process in the action, the defendant moved to
quash service on the ground that the California court lacked jurisdiction
over his person. As posed by the Court, the question was "whether, in this
action for child support, the California state courts may exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor
children domiciled within the State."2 Reiterating that the existence of
personal jurisdiction requires "a sufficient connection between the defend-
ant and the forum State as to make it fair to require defense of the action
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Meth-
odist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978).
2. Id. at 1694, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 137 (italics in original).
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in the forum,"' 3 the Court sustained the defendant's contentions, conclud-
ing that "the mere act of sending a child to California to live with her
mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent to obtain nor expec-
tancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that would make
fair the assertion of that State's judicial jurisdiction."4
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute, article 2031b,5 continues to be
the subject of judicial measurement. Black v. Acme Markets, Inc. ,6 a re-
cent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, is
both a procedural and a substantive yardstick. The plaintiffs, Texas pro-
ducers and feeders of cattle, brought suit in Texas against several super-
market chains, alleging that they had violated the federal antitrust laws.
One of the defendants, a Massachusetts corporation, was served under ar-
ticle 2031b, and it responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. An affidavit, the factual averments of which were not contro-
verted, was submitted in support of the motion to dismiss. Based upon the
affidavit and pleadings, the trial court concluded that it did not have juris-
diction over the movant.
It is well settled in federal court that the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant is amenable to process under the forum state's juris-
dictional statute.7 While the complaint in Black alleged that the
defendants had conspired to depress beef prices and had caused injury to
the plaintiffs' business "in Texas,"8 no affidavit or other proof of these
facts were submitted by the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, finding that the record
established that the alleged conspiracy had produced effects in Texas, the
Fifth Circuit decided that "[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the allegations of the complaint, except insofar as
controverted by the defendant's affidavit, must be taken as true."9
Black is also informative for its clarification of the "unrelated contacts"
theory. Declaring what had been suggested more hesitantly in earlier
cases,'° the Fifth Circuit proclaimed that business contacts that are unre-
lated to the asserted cause of action are relevant to and will support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction." The movant did not maintain an office,
3. Id. at 1697, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 141 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
4. 98 S. Ct. at 1702, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
5. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
6. 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977).
7. See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 490 (5th Cir. 1974);
Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Hoppenfeld
v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Taylor v. Ameri-
can Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1972, no writ);
Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ).
8. 564 F.2d at 683.
9. Id. at 683 n.3; see Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258, 262 n.8 (5th Cir.
1975).
10. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 939 (1977); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1235 (5th Cir. 1973);
Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1970); Eyerly Aircraft Co.
v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 595-96 (5th Cir. 1969).
1I. 564 F.2d at 686 n.7; accord, McBride v. Owens, 454 F. Supp. 731, 735 n.1 (S.D. Tex.
1978); Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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place of business, or any employees in Texas; it had solicited no business
and made no sales in Texas; and, significantly, it had purchased no beef
products of any kind from any person in Texas. Although unrelated to the
asserted cause of action, the defendant had purchased approximately
$374,000 worth of aluminum foil from a firm in Carrollton, Texas,
$1,069,000 worth of salad oil from a business located in Dallas, Texas, and
turkeys valued at $64,000 from a company in Lampasas, Texas, for an
aggregate of some $1,500,000 worth of products from the Texas market-
place. Reversing the trial court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "[w]e have no doubt that Texas
courts would construe section 2031b to reach an out-of-state corporation
which had made purchases of products originating in Texas amounting to
nearly $1.5 million in a single year and is alleged to have engaged in a
conspiracy whose effects would almost certainly be felt by Texas cattle
producers." 12
Stretching the Texas "long-arm" to its limits is the decision considered
in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell. 3 The plaintiff, a publicly owned
Delaware corporation with major offices in Texas, sought to challenge the
constitutionality of the Idaho takeover statute by suing the Idaho official
responsible for enforcing it. Previously, the plaintiff had made a tender
offer for a substantial number of the shares of Sunshine Mining and Metal
Company, a publicly owned company incorporated in Washington with its
principal offices and the majority of its assets located in Idaho. After an
unsuccessful attempt to comply with the applicable Idaho takeover statute,
the plaintiff commenced suit in Texas and effected service on the defend-
ant under article 2031b. Reducing its inquiry to whether "due process per-
mits a court in Texas to exercise jurisdiction over the Idaho official who
has enforced the Idaho takeover law to prevent a Texas-based corporation
from proceeding with a national tender offer,"' 4 the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that
"the actions of the Idaho defendant under the Idaho takeover law ...
amounted to the regulation of [plaintiff] Great Western's Texas-based
business activities."' 5
Straining the "long-arm" of article 2031b in another way, a federal
district court had concluded during a previous survey period that the
Texas activities of a parent corporation should be imputed to its subsidiary
for jurisdictional purposes, thereby allowing the court to sustain nonresi-
dent service on the subsidiary. 6 In a more recent case, Walker v.
12. 564 F.2d at 685.
13. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (2-1 decision), appealgranted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S.
Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-759).
14. Id. at 1266.
15. Id. at 1270.
16. Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974), discussed in Figari, Texas
Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 265, 266 (1975). Conversely, one
federal district court has concluded that the Texas activities of a subsidiary corporation
should be imputed to its parent for jurisdictional purposes so as to sustain nonresident serv-
ice on the parent. Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex.
1979]
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Newgent,"7 the same court focused on the evidentiary requirements of
such an extension of the long-arm statute. The plaintiff brought suit in a
federal district court against two corporate defendants, one a subsidiary of
the other, seeking recovery for personal injuries arising from an automo-
bile collision in Germany involving an Opel automobile that was manu-
factured by the subsidiary in Germany. Although the parent corporation
did not contest the court's jurisdiction over its person, the subsidiary,
which was neither incorporated nor licensed to transact business in Texas,
challenged service upon it by filing a motion to dismiss. In response, the
plaintiff claimed that a control relationship between the parent company
and the subsidiary justified imputing the Texas activities of the parent to
the subsidiary. While the parent company owned all of the common stock
of the subsidiary, the evidence reflected that they did not have the same
corporate offices, that they had no mutual officers or directors, and that
each company had its own engineering staff and sources of supply for com-
ponent parts. Finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the prima
facie existence of a control relationship, the federal district court held that
the Texas activities of the parent could not be imputed to the subsidiary
for jurisdictional purposes and dismissed the subsidiary from the action.
An additional point of interest in Newgenl was the court's treatment of
the plaintiffs contention that the subsidiary corporation had waived its
jurisdictional defense when an unauthorized answer was filed on its behalf.
Service was initially attempted by delivery of a single citation to the parent
company's registered agent in Texas. The attorneys for the parent, upon
the instructions of its insurer, filed an answer on behalf of both corpora-
tions. The subsidiary company, which had not authorized the submission
of an answer on its behalf, did not learn of the suit until more than a year
after the answer was filed. Upon discovering the mistake, the subsidiary
moved to withdraw the answer and attempted to assert its jurisdictional
defense. Since the subsidiary was a separate corporate entity and the an-
swer was filed without its knowledge or consent, the court concluded that
the answer did not operate as a waiver of its jurisdictional defense.' 8
Demonstrating yet another application of the Texas long-arm statute,
Diversifted Resources Corp. v. Geodynamics Oil and Gas, Inc. '9 was the first
case to apply article 2031b to a suit for the enforcement of a settlement
agreement terminating earlier litigation between the parties. The plaintiff
sued a nonresident defendant in state court to recover on an agreement
and a promissory note given in connection with the settlement of an earlier
action between the parties in a federal district court in Texas. Sustaining
service on the defendant under article 2031b, the court concluded:
[T]he defendant by executing the note, which clearly reflected the
1971). But see Murdock v. Volvo of America Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Tex. 1975);
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973). See generaly
Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
17. 442 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Tex. 1977), aft'd, 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978).
18. Id. at 39.
19. 558 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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payments were due in the State of Texas, and by executing the agree-
ment which settled the lawsuit on file in the Southern District of
Texas wherein the settlement was to be performed in the State of
Texas, not only purposefully conducted business in the State of Texas
but it also contracted to perform its obligations within the State of
Texas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of this State's law.2°
II. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Rule 120a, which governs special appearances to challenge personal ju-
risdiction in the state court, requires that such- an appearance "shall be
made by sworn motion" filed prior to any other pleading or motion.2' As
originally adopted, rule 120a contained no provision allowing an amend-
ment of the special appearance motion to correct a deficiency; 22 moreover,
the filing of an unsworn motion constituted a general appearance, subject-
ing the movant to the jurisdiction of the court for all purposes.23 When a
special appearance motion is deficient in some respect, rule 120a now per-
mits amendment of the motion in order to cure the defect.24 Despite the
plaintiffs contentions that an unsworn special appearance motion cannot
be amended under rule 120a to add a verification and that submission of
the unsworn motion constituted a general appearance, the court in Dennett
v. First Continental Investment Corp.25 held that rule 120a permits an
amendment to verify the motion.26 The court also concluded that the
amendment could even be made after the special appearance hearing,
since the crucial focus of the rule was on "the allowance of amendment,
and the timing of the amendment [was] not determinative."27
Rule 120a also has been a source of uncertainty for a party obliged to
establish his position on jurisdiction at a special appearance hearing. Due
to the rule's failure to specify the type of proof that may be received at
such a hearing, the use of affidavits for this purpose has always been in
doubt. Adhering to a strict approach, the court in Main Bank & Trust v.
Nye 28 condemned the use of affidavits for this purpose and ruled them
inadmissible as evidence at special appearance hearings.
29
20. Id. at 99.
21. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
22. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a (1967).
23. Stewart v. Walton Enterprises, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973,
writ refd n.r.e.); Austin Rankin Corp. v. Cadillac Pool Corp., 421 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1967, no writ).
24. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a. See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 294 (1976).
25. 559 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
26. 559 S.W.2d at 385; cf. Duncan v. Denton County, 133 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd) (amendment of unsworn controverting affidavit to add verifi-
cation permitted).
27. 559 S.W.2d at 386 (emphasis in original); cf Hoffer Oil Co. v. Brian, 38 S.W.2d 596
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, no writ) (amendment of controverting affidavit permitted
on date of venue hearing).
28. 571 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ filed).
29. Id. at 223. In contrast, when an objection to personal jurisdiction is asserted in
federal court, affidavits represent a proper method of proof. E.g., Edwards v. Associated
19791
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III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The recent court of civil appeals decision in Curry Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co. 30 suggests that courts will consider service of process
defective unless the officer's return of citation specifies the manner in
which the defendant was served. Finding that a return that stated citation
had been executed upon the defendant corporation "by serving" its vice-
president was conclusory, the court invalidated service of process and set
aside a default judgment based thereon. 3'
In Sheshunoff& Co. v. ScholP2 the corporation against whom a default
judgment had been taken contended that the record failed to establish the
agency of the person to whom process was delivered. Overruling this ar-
gument, the court held:
When the petition alleges and the citation states the name of the cor-
poration and its registered agent and the return shows service on the
defendant through the named individual, no extrinsic evidence of the
agent's authority is required unless the fact of agency or authority be
put in issue by an affidavit of the party served or a motion by the
party to quash.33
IV. VENUE
Berton Land Development Corp. v. Ryan Mortgage Investors,34 a recent
decision of the Texas Supreme Court, indicates that affirmative defenses,
which are in the nature of confession and avoidance, are not available in a
venue contest. In Berton the plaintiffs sought to enjoin foreclosure of a
deed of trust held by defendants, and affirmatively sought to recover dam-
ages for fraud and usury. The defendant filed a plea of privilege to be
sued in its county of residence, and subject thereto, asserted in an amended
answer the affirmative defense of res judicata. Although the plaintiffs filed
a controverting affidavit that specified several exceptions under article
1995, 31 they did not respond to the defendant's affirmative defense until
filing a trial amendment at the time of the venue hearing.
The trial court, at a hearing on both venue and injunctive relief, over-
ruled the plea of privilege and granted plaintiffs the temporary injunction.
Press, 512 F.2d 258, 262 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[c]onsideration of affidavits.., are appropri-
ate means for resolving jurisdictional disputes"); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d
1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1971) ("when considering a challenge to its jurisdiction, a court may
receive and weigh affidavits").
30. 565 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
31. Id. at 106-07; accord, Continental Ins. Co. v. Miliken, 64 Tex. 46, 47-48 (1885);
Peoples Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Mallard, 337 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960,
writ ref'd).
32. 560 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), rev'don other grounds, 564
S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1977).
33. 560 S.W.2d at 116.
34. 563 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam).
35. TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1978-79). Several of
the exceptions relied upon by the plaintiffs, by their nature, require proof of a cause of




On appeal, the Beaumont court of civil appeals reversed and rendered,
holding that until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, the plea of
res judicata conclusively established the nonexistence of the plaintiffs
case.36 The court stated that the plaintiffs response to the defendant's af-
firmative defense, because not contained within the controverting affidavit,
could not be considered at the venue hearing. Since the controverting affi-
davit failed to include facts necessary to have sustained venue in the
county of suit, the court concluded that the plea of privilege should not
have been overruled and, therefore, transferred the case to the defendant's
county of residence.3" The Texas Supreme Court, observing that "affirma-
tive defenses go to the merits of an action and not to the interlocutory
matter of venue," held that "the affirmative defense of res adjudicata is not
subject to consideration in a hearing on a Plea of Privilege., 38 Thus, the
cause was remanded for determination of whether the plea of privilege
could properly have been overruled under the exceptions averred by the
plaintiff.
The venue treatment of national banks received substantial attention
during the survey period. The federal statute that governs the venue of a
suit against a national banking association provides that "actions and pro-
ceedings against any association . . may be had . . in any State...
court in the county or city in which said association is located.",39 Gener-
ally, the statute has been interpreted to require that a suit against a na-
tional bank be brought in the county of its domicile.4" According to an
early case,4 ' however, "local" actions are excluded from the application of
the statute. Focusing on this exception, the court in Peoples National Bank
v. Cranek42 held that an action against a national bank for damages to
mineral property and to quiet title to mineral property was "local" in na-
ture and, therefore, exempted from the federal statute.4 3 In addition, the
court in Security National Bank v. Was,.,ington Loan & Finance Corp.'
suggested that a claim against a national bank to determine the ownership
of a certificate of deposit, being an action in rem or concerning a particular
res, would be "local" to the county in which the certificate is located or
held. In accord with earlier cases,45 Robertson v. Union Planters National
36. Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Berton Land Dev. Corp., 556 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1977), rev'd, 563 W.2d 811 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 364.
38. 563 S.W.2d at 812; accord, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Howard, 487
S.W.2d 708 (Tex. 1972).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976).
40. See, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
41. Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880).
42. 557 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd).
43. Id. at 333-34. Compare Houston Nat'l Bank v. Farris, 549 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd) (action for improper drainage of mineral property is "local"
in nature), with South Padre Dev. Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 538 S.W.2d 475
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ) (action seeking recovery for usury in connec-
tion with loan and an injunction restraining sale of realty under deed of trust securing the
loan is "transitory" in nature).
44. 570 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
45. Rivera v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 547 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1977,
1979]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Bank 6 held that in a suit against a national bank for wrongful reposses-
sion of an automobile, the bank's conduct in the county of suit did not
constitute a waiver of its federal venue right.
Subdivision 31 of article 1995, 4" which governs venue in products liabil-
ity cases, was added in 1973 to authorize venue in specified counties in
"[s]uits for breach of warranty by a manufacturer of consumer goods." In
Hall v. Ford Motor Co. ,48 a case construing this subdivision, the Corpus
Christi court of civil appeals concluded that in establishing venue of a
claim for breach of warranty by a manufacturer of consumer goods, a
plaintiff need not prove his cause of action at the venue hearing. A liberal
interpretation of subdivision 31 was enunciated by the same court in
Trucker's Equipment, Inc. v. Sandoval.4 9 "A manufacturer. . . within the
meaning of subdivision 31," held the court, "includes an entity which as-
sembles articles or fabrics that someone else has made and by reason of the
assembly produces a useful article." 5
Sandoval is also instructive for its interpretation of the term "consumer
goods." The allegedly defective product involved in the action was a hy-
draulic hose and coupling assembly, which was a component of a cotton
shredder that was used with a tractor. Relying on a recent decision5 that
held a tractor used for agricultural purposes to be included within the
meaning of "consumer goods" in subdivision 31, the court held that a com-
ponent of a product, for purposes of subdivision 31, assumes the nature of
the product. 2 Since the hydraulic hose and the coupling were component
parts of the cotton shredder and the shredder was used with a tractor that
was within the category of goods used for agricultural purposes, the court
could see "no sound reason for differentiating. .. [such] component parts
from the entire product in question."5 3
Prior to 1977 the venue of an action under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act was governed by former section
17.56, which provided that "[ajn action brought under" the Act may be
commenced in the county in which the person against whom the suit is
no writ) (wrongful repossession of mobile home in county of suit did not constitute waiver);
First Nat'l Bank v. Stoutco, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ
dism'd) (wrongful garnishment of funds in county of suit did not constitute waiver). Contra,
Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1974) (wrongful garnishment of funds in county of suit did constitute waiver), vacated as
moot, 18 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 278 (April 12, 1975).
46. 561 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (31) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
48. 565 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Tex Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
49. 569 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
50. Id. at 522. The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals, during an earlier survey pe-
riod, concluded that a seller of a chair which collapsed and resulted in personal injuries to
the plaintiff was not a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the provision. White Stores,
Inc. v. Fielding, 533 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
51. Maintenance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd).




brought resides, has his principal place of business, or is doing business.5 4
Several earlier cases construing that section held that in establishing venue
of a claim seeking redress for a deceptive trade practice, a plaintiff must
plead and prove a cause of action under the Act.55 Apparently dissatisfied
with this construction, the legislature amended section 17.56, effective May
23, 1977, to provide that "[a]n action brought which alleges a claim to re-
lief' under the Act may be commenced in the locations previously speci-
fied.5 6 It remains to be seen whether the amendment will relieve a plaintiff
asserting a claim under the Act from having to prove a cause of action in
order to establish venue. Hanssard v. Ledbetter,57 the only case during the
survey period that reviewed the amendment to section 17.56, did not ad-
dress the issue. Noting that the suit before it was instituted prior to the
effective date of the amendment, the court acknowledged the rule that
venue of an action is controlled by the law in effect at the time of its filing
and held that venue of the suit was governed by former section 17.56. In
so ruling the court adhered to the previous construction of the provision.58
A case worthy of attention by the trust practitioner is Aleman v. Laborers
National Pension Fund.59 Article 7425b-24B, which specifies the situs of
suits involving a trust, provides that "[w]here there are two or more trust-
ees, then the venue shall be in the county where the principal office of the
trust is maintained."6 In this suit brought against a pension plan trust,
which was created under a federal statute and had ten trustees, the court
concluded that, regardless of the nature of the trust, venue was controlled
by article 7425b-24(B); thus, the action should be transferred to the
county where the principal office of the trust was maintained.
The attorney representing a general partner of a limited partnership and
desiring to preserve his client's venue rights should take note of Stroud's
Creek Homeowners' Association v. Brown.6 1 The plaintiff brought suit to
recover damages against a limited partnership for failure to complete cer-
tain improvements in a real estate subdivision located in the county of suit.
Service was effected upon two individuals who were the general partners
of the defendant. After the partnership filed its answer, the plaintiff
amended its petition, formally naming the two general partners as individ-
ual defendants. In an attempt to obtain a transfer of the claims asserted
against them individually, the two general partners filed pleas of privilege
seeking a transfer of those claims to their respective counties of residence.
Observing that article 2033 provides "[clitation served upon one member
54. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 322.
55. Joc Oil Aromatics, Inc. v. Commercial Fuel Oil Co., 564 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ); Hudson & Hudson Realtors v. Savage, 545 S.W.2d
863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); Doyle v. Grady, 543 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
56. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (emphasis added).
57. 561 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no wnt).
58. Id. at 36-37.
59. 558 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
60. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-24B (Vernon 1960).
61. 567 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ dism'd).
1979]
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of a partnership or firm shall be sufficient to authorize a judgment against
the firm and the partners actually served,"62 the court concluded that "the
two general partners. . . were properly before the court from the time that
the original answer was filed" and "[tlhe filing of the answer resulted in a
waiver of any venue complaint."63
The venue treatment of ancillary claims also received attention during
the survey period. Section 2(g) of the Texas comparative negligence stat-
ute, which provides that "[a]ll claims for contribution between named de-
fendants in the primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit,"64 has
been construed to be a mandatory venue provision requiring a crossclaim
for contribution between defendants named in the primary suit to be tried
in the county where the court hearing such suit is situated.65 When the
claim for contribution was asserted by a third-party action against a party
not named by the plaintiff in the primary suit, however, the court in Cha-
ney v. Coleman Co.66 found the venue requirements of the statute to be
inapplicable, noting that section 2(g) controls only the venue of claims be-
tween named defendants in the primary suit.67
Under the Middlebrook doctrine, a long-standing venue rule predicated
on the public policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, a plaintiff who in
good faith asserts two or more claims properly joined in a single action
against the same defendant can maintain venue upon all of the claims in a
county where venue is proper as to one of the claims.6 8 Earlier cases69
focusing on the relative size of the claims suggested that the rule does not
apply when the cause of action upon which venue is predicated is merely
incidental to the main cause of action. Adhering to the more progressive
view,7" the court in Lindsey v. Security Savings Association71 concluded
that "[ijf venue as to one cause of action is proper in the county in which
suit was brought, then all properly joined causes of action against the de-
fendant should be maintained in that county to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, regardless of the relative size of recovery sought in the various causes
62. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2033 (Vernon 1960).
63. 567 S.W.2d at 250.
64. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
65. Winningham v. Connor, 552 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ);
LaSora v. Burr, 516 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Edwards, 512 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ).
66. 567 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
67. See Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied Jus-
tice, 5 ST. MARYS L.J. 655 (1973); Comment, Multiole Party Litigation in Comparative Negli-
gence. Incomplete Resolution of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669, 674-75
(1978).
68. See Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S.W. 935 (1894).
69. Auto Refin. Corp. v. Smith, 84 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935,
no writ); Bateman v. McGee, 50 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ).
70. See Brazos Valley Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Beavers, 535 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, writ dism'd); Burke v. Scott, 400 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1966, writ dism'd).




Sanchez v. Lewis Refrigeration Co.73 warns defendants asserting venue
rights that the copy of the plea of privilege served on the plaintiff should
show that it has been filed. Holding that "the time for filing a contro-
verting plea does not begin to run until the plaintiff receives notification
that the plea of privilege has beenfiled,'74 the court excused a twenty-two
day delay in the filing of a controverting plea due to defendant's service of
an unfiled plea of privilege. "To hold otherwise," the court reasoned,
"would place an unreasonable and onerous burden on the plantiff to make
continuous inquiry of the court as to whether the plea of privilege had, in
fact, been filed."75
V. PLEADINGS
Rule 18576 provides that a suit on sworn account "shall be taken as
prima facie evidence thereof, unless the party resisting such claim shall
. . . file a written denial, under oath" stating specifically why the account
is not just and true. Furthermore, "[w]hen the opposite party fails to file
such affidavit, he shall not be permitted to deny the claim."77 In a situa-
tion in which the defendant had not included a sworn denial in its answer,
the Texas Supreme Court in Airborne Freight Corp. v. CRB Marketing,
Inc.71 confronted the issue of whether the plaintiff must formally intro-
duce evidence of the account at the trial. Relying upon rule 185, the court
concluded that "[s]ince the defendant failed to file a sworn denial of the
account, no further evidence was required," and "[tlhe sworn account
therefore constituted prima facie evidence of the debt, without the neces-
sity of formally introducing the account into evidence."79
It should be noted that in Garza v. Allied Finance Co.8 ° a petition con-
taining a prayer for a specific money judgment and general relief was held
to be insufficient to support a judgment decreeing a judicial foreclosure of
a security interest. Citing rule 301 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
the court held that judicial foreclosure was a separate remedy from a per-
sonal judgment against the debtor; thus, it must be specifically requested.
VI. LIMITATIONS
Article 5539c8' extends the limitation period an additional thirty days
72. 1d. at 571.
73. 568 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ).
74. Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
77. Id.
78. 566 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 575.
80. 566 S.W.2d 57, 61-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
81. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539c (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). The statute was
intended to change the result in cases such as Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91
S.W.2d 313 (1936). See generally McElhaney, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 179, 192 (1970).
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on a counterclaim or crossclaim that otherwise would have been barred by
the applicable statute of limitation between the answer date and the time
the plaintiff filed his original petition, provided such claim arises out of the
same transaction upon which the plaintiffs suit is based. A recent decision
of the Texas Supreme Court, Hobbs Trailers v. J.T Arnett Grain Co.,2
adds a new dimension to the interpretation of article 5539c, indicating that
realignment of the parties after the filing of suit will not enlarge the appli-
cation of the statute. The plaintiff, Arnett Grain, filed suit against Hobbs
Trailer for breach of warranty at a time when its claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. The defendant, Hobbs Trailer, filed an
answer raising the defense of limitations and asserted a counterclaim that
was not barred. After extensive pleading, however, Arnett Grain was re-
aligned as the defendant and it sought to assert its claim for breach of
warranty defensively as a setoff to avoid the plea of limitations. The court
acknowledged that,
[i]f the breach of contract action had been asserted in a counterclaim
or crossclaim, Article 5539c would have extended the period for filing
the claim for thirty days beyond the date the defendant's answer was
due in the original suit, even though the counterclaim or crossclaim
would otherwise be barred by limitation, provided the claim arose out
of the same transaction as the plaintiffs suit. 3
Nevertheless, the court noted that Arnett Grain was the original plaintiff
and "[o]nly after Hobbs answered as a defendant and the trial court re-
aligned the parties did Arnett Grain become defendant." 4 Reasoning that
article 5539c was not intended to be used in this fashion, the court con-
cluded "that the statute does not extend the limitation period when the
claim was originally asserted as other than a counterclaim or cross-
claim." 5
VII. PARTIES
Breedlove v. United States Department of Air Force,6 which arose prior
to the recent amendment of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure concerning
garnishment, 7 indicates that the absence of notice to or joinder of the
debtor in a prejudgment garnishment proceeding constitutes the omission
of an indispensable party and affects the power of the trial court to proceed
in the matter. Given the fourteenth amendment due process requirements
in the area of creditors' prejudgment remedies, 8 the court held that "the
82. 560 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. 1978).
83. Id. at 88.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 89.
86. 569 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
87. See Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 40 TEX. B.J. 709 (1977). See generaly Soules,
Attachment, Sequestration, and Garnishment: The 1977 Rules, 32 Sw. L.J. 753 (1978).
88. See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted in
29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Garcia v. Krausse,
380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504
S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
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absence of the alleged debtor from the garnishment case because of lack of
notice to him, resulted in absence of an indispensable party and presented
fundamental error" and "Ulurisdiction over [an] indispensable party to suit
is as essential to [a] court's right and power to proceed to judgment as its
jurisdiction of subject matter." 89 On the basis of this omission the court set
aside a default judgment entered in the proceeding against the garnishee.
Although Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 663a 9" was recently enacted to
require notice to or joinder of the debtor in such a situation,9" the founda-
tion of this requirement remains constitutional in nature and Breedlove
should therefore control a situation arising under the new rule when there
has been noncompliance.
VIII. DISCOVERY
The judicial treatment of attorney-client communications was recently
discussed by the Texas Supreme Court in West v. Solito.92 In a suit to set
aside and cancel certain deeds of mineral interests allegedly made by the
plaintiff while she was incompetent, the defendants, through the use of
subpoenas duces tecum, sought to depose and obtain various documents
from the attorneys who represented the plaintiff at the time in question.
Asserting her attorney-client privilege with respect to any information ob-
tained by the attorneys during the period in which they represented her,
the plaintiff filed motions for protective orders pursuant to rule 186b.93 At
the conclusion of a hearing on the motions and without examining the
materials in question, the trial court ordered (1) that the attorney-witnesses
should testify as to all matters about which they had knowledge and that
any objections based upon the attorney-client privilege were not waived,
but were preserved and could be urged at the time of trial and should be
determined by the trial court either on motion in limine or upon the tender
of such testimony as evidence, and (2) that the attorney-witnesses should
produce the records requested without their being subject to inspection by
anyone, but
should any party so desire he may have the records marked as an
Exhibit and made a part of the deposition and in such event such
records, without having been inspected or read by any party or any
attorney, shall be delivered into the custody of the Court Reporter
and shall be sealed by the Court Reporter and delivered into the cus-
tody of the Clerk of this Court, subject to the further orders of this
Court.
9 4
On appeal, the supreme court concluded that the order of the trial court
was too broad with respect to both the deposition testimony and the sub-
89. 569 S.W.2d at 583-84.
90. TEX. R. Civ. P. 663a (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
91. See Dorsaneo, Creditors'Rights, Annual Surpey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 245, 279-
80 (1978).
92. 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978).
93. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186b.
94. 563 S.W.2d at 243.
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poenaed documents. With regard to that portion of the order dealing with
the deposition testimony, the court stated:
[I]t requires the attorneys to answer all of the deposition questions
posed to them, regardless of any objections based on the attorney-
client privilege, thereby causing disclosure of matters that might
otherwise be protected by the privilege. A judicial determination of
what matters, if any, are privileged in this case comes only after the
matters have already been disclosed. A motion in limine or objection
to the testimony at the time it is offered as evidence is totally inade-
quate to preserve the privilege, for once the matter has been disclosed,
it cannot be retracted or otherwise protected.95
Further, with respect to the portion of the order requiring surrender of the
subpoenaed documents, the court held as follows:
[W]e think that an attorney should not be required to produce docu-
ments that he considers to be within the attorney-client privilege until
after a trial court has determined whether or not they are privileged.
Moreover, the post-production method of protection by making the
produced documents subject to the further orders of the court is insuf-
ficient to preserve the confidentiality of documents that might be priv-
ileged. There is nothing in the order which limits the court's power to
release all or part of the produced documents at a later date without
first making a determination of what documents are privileged. 96
In making these determinations, the court directed the trial court to pursue
other alternatives. Relying upon rule 215a, 97 the court suggested that the
attorney-deponents refuse to answer any questions that would violate the
privilege; after completing the deposition as to all other matters, the exam-
ming party could apply to the trial court for an order to compel answer to
the contested questions, at which time the trial court could determine
whether the matter sought to be discovered was within the privilege. Fur-
thermore, to preserve the privilege as to the documents sought, the court
concluded that the trial court should examine them to determine which of
the items, if any, were privileged prior to the production of any such docu-
ments.
Rule 168, which governs interrogatory practice, provides that "[a] party
may be required in his answers to identify each person whom he expects to
call as an expert witness at the trial and to state the subject matter concern-
ing which the expert is expected to testify."98 A Houston court of civil
appeals found that an interrogatory requesting the defendant to "specify
the names of any and all witnesses that it would call upon to testify at the
trial" was too general to support the exclusion at trial of the testimony of
an expert whose name was not supplied in response. 99 The court held that
"[sjince Rule 168. . . contemplates that a party serving interrogatories re-
95. Id. at 245.
96. Id. at 246.
97. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215a.
98. Id. 168.
99. Meyerland Co. v. Palais Royal of Houston, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
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quire that the other party identify persons he expects to call as an expert
witness, he must specifically request the names of such expert wit-
nesses." ioo
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 166-A,' ° ' which governs summary judgment practice, stipulates
that "[siworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith."' 2 Focusing on
the requirement of a "sworn copy," the Texas Supreme Court in Life In-
surance Co. v. Gar-Dal, Inc. 103 resolved the question of what constitutes
sufficient documentary evidence for summary judgment purposes. The
court considered an affidavit that stated that an attached photocopy of an
instrument was "a true and correct copy" of the original, and held that the
photocopy was properly identified and constituted a "sworn copy" within
the meaning of rule 166-A." Furthermore, the court observed, the con-
tention that the instrument was not properly sworn or authenticated was
directed to a defect of form, 0 5 and such a defect should be deemed waived
if not pointed out to the trial court before summary judgment was ren-
dered.' O Although the situation in Gar-Dal arose under former rule 166-
A, the court's classification of a defect in the authentication of an instru-
ment as being one of form would appear equally applicable to practice
-under present rule 166-A.
Despite the rule 166-A requirement that "[the motion for summary
judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor,"' 7 the court in Jones v.
McSpedden,'018 construing the identical provision under former rule
166-A,' O concluded that the failure to specify grounds in such a motion
was not in itself grounds for reversal. l" 0 "If the opposing party files an
exception to the motion stating that failure to specify the ground for sum-
100. Id. at 537-38 (emphasis in original).
101. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
102. Id. 166-A(e).
103. 570 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1978). Although Gar-Dal considered a situation arising under
former rule 166-A, TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A (Vernon 1976), the provision concerning sworn
copies of instruments was carried foward to present rule 166-A.
104. 570 S.W.2d at 380; accord, Hackett v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 570 S.W.2d 184, 187
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ); Roland v. McCullough, 561 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Broaddus v. Town N. Nat'l Bank, 558
S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977), rey'don other grounds, 569 S.W. 2d 489 (Tex.
1978).
105. 570 S.W.2d at 380-81.
106. Id.; see Jones v. McSpedden, 560 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ). The holding in Gar-Dal is representative of existing case law interpreting former rule
166-A; see, e.g., Texas Nat'l Corp. v. United Sys. Int'l, Inc., 493 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1973);
Perkins v. Crittenden, 462 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1970). The recently amended version of rule
166-A, however, now expressly provides that "[d]efects in the form of affidavits or attach-
ments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an
opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend." TEX. R. Cv. P. 166-A(e).
107. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
108. 560 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
109. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c) (Vernon 1976).
110. 560 S.W.2d at 179.
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mary judgment leaves him without adequate information for opposing the
motion, and this exception is overruled," stated the court, "then he might
have a valid complaint on appeal.""'
Rule 166-A further provides that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein."' 1 2 In a suit on a note
upon which a summary judgment had been granted, the supreme court
recently held that a statement in an opposing affidavit that "all offsets and
payments had not been credited to the note" was conclusory and therefore
insufficient to raise an issue of fact.' 13 Similarly, in an attempt to support
a defense of lack of consideration in another suit involving a note, an as-
sertion in an opposing affidavit that the claimants "'knew the [certain]
interests and stock therein mentioned were of no value whatsoever and
worthless'" was held to state an opinion about a person's state of mind
and insufficient to raise any genuine issue of material fact on the point. 14
X. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
The most significant development during the survey period concerning
the assertion of a motion for directed verdict was Holloway v. Har-Con
Engineering Co. "' In Holloway the plaintiffs brought suit against two sets
of defendants to recover damages to their home resulting from a fire
caused by either a water heater or a furnace. The primary claims, aimed at
the manufacturer and installer of the heater, alleged that the fire was at-
tributable to a defective heater and the improper method used to install it.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs alleged that some act or omission by the manu-
facturer and installer of the furnace caused the damage. At the conclusion
of the plaintiffs' case in chief the trial court granted motions for directed
verdicts in favor of the manufacturer and installer of the furnace. Chal-
lenging the propriety of this action on appeal, the plaintiffs conceded that
the lack of evidence at the time the motions were asserted supported the
trial court's ruling. The plaintiffs, however, argued that the motions were
premature because all of the defendants were claimed to be jointly and
severally liable; thus, evidence against the manufacturer and installer of
the furnace might have been adduced during the presentation of the other
defendants' cases. Observing that the point was one of the first impression
in Texas, the court affirmed the action of the trial court, holding that "ap-
pellate review of directed verdicts is limited to a consideration of the evi-
dence adduced at the time the motion was granted, and does not involve
review of all the evidence in the case."' 1 6
111. Id.
112. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
113. Life Ins. Co. v. Gar-Dal, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex. 1978).
114. Jones v. McSpedden, 560 S.W.2d 177, 180-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ).
115. 563 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
116. Id. at 697; accord, Gibson v. Newhouse, 402 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1966); cf. Pope v.
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XI. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
Abolishing the former requirement that special issues be submitted dis-
tinctly and separately," ' rule 277 now provides that "[i]t shall be discre-
tionary with the court whether to submit separate questions with respect to
each element of a case or to submit issues broadly," and that "[i]t shall not
be objectionable that a question is general or includes a combination of
elements or issues." " 8 Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, a
Texas Supreme Court decision reviewed during the previous survey pe-
riod,'2 ° has produced significant controversy regarding the submission of
generalized special issues. A motion for rehearing filed in the case precipi-
tated a further opinion during this survey period and the rendition of addi-
tional guidelines in the area.' 2 ' The trial court had submitted the issue of
negligence broadly by inquiring whether "on the occasion in question the
[defendant] railroad was negligent."' 22 Finding that some of the pleaded
acts of negligence were unsupported by the evidence and that the record
contained evidence of other possible negligent acts that were not pleaded,
the supreme court ruled that "failure to limit the broad ultimate fact issue
to acts which were raised by both pleadings and proof violates rule
277.""'23 The court stated that compliance with the rule could be accom-
plished by listing the relevant acts or omissions in a broad issue, in a
checklist form, or in a complementary instruction.' 24 With respect to the
latter method, however, the court disapproved a suggested instruction that
would have informed the jury members that they could "consider only
those acts which are both alleged in the pleading and supported by the
evidence."' 25
Clarifying its original holding, the court, in an opinion on the motion for
rehearing, reiterated that "[i]f there is a variance between the pleadings
and the proof. . . , upon proper request, the trial court should limit a
broad issue to those acts or omissions which are included within the plead-
ings and supported by some evidence," but cautioned that "this does not
Clary, 161 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, writ refd w.o.m.) (subse-
quent finding ofjury cannot be used to challenge directed verdict).
117. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 1967). See generally Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., IlII
Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
118. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. See generally Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better
Special Verdict Systemfor Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973).
119. 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978), noted in 32 Sw. L.J. 859 (1978).
120. See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 407, 420
(1978).
121. See 572 S.W.2d at 281-82.
122. Id. at 276 n.2.
123. Id. at 277. The court distinguished Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muckleroy, 523
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), on the basis that
Muckleroy contained some evidence in support of all of the alleged acts of negligence. 572
S.W.2d at 276.
124. 572 S.W.2d at 278.
125. Id. at 277. The court also held that an "Act of God" defense should be submitted in
the form of an explanatory instruction following the definitions of "negligence" and "cause
in whole or in part." Id. at 279.
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require separate questions as to each of such acts or omissions."' 126 Ac-
cording to the court, the limitation might be accomplished "by including in
a single issue all of the alleged negligent acts or omissions which are raised
by the pleadings and evidence, as: 'was the defendant negligent in - or
or - ?'" or "by submitting a broad negligence inquiry and follow-
ing it with a complementary instruction which would limit the jury to con-
sideration of the specified acts or omissions raised by the pleadings and the
evidence" or by "the checklist form."1 27
In Cooper v. Boyar 12 1 the Waco court of civil appeals approved the sub-
mission of the elements of causation and existence of injury in a single
issue inquiring whether the assault on the plaintiff "was the proximate
cause of the injury, if any," suffered by him. 129 Similarly, in Stoner v.
Hudgins'3° the Fort Worth court of civil appeals combined two elements
when it endorsed the submission of a penal statute violation in an intersec-
tional collision case in an issue inquiring whether the defendant "entered
the intersection contrary to law" accompanied by an instruction specifying
the requirements of applicable law. 3'
Under former practice the trial judge was required to frame his charge
so as to "not therein comment on the weight of the evidence."' 13 2 This
phrase was deleted by the 1973 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, 133 and the trial judge is now merely prohibited from comment-
ing "directly" on the weight of the evidence.' 3 The effect of this change
was recently considered by the supreme court in McDonald Transit, Inc. v.
Moore, 135 a suit against the defendant bus company to recover for per-
sonal injuries the plaintiff suffered while a passenger on one of its buses.
The defense of sudden emergency was raised by the pleadings and evi-
dence, and the trial court instructed the jury regarding the defense as fol-
lows:
When a person is confronted by an emergency arising suddenly and
unexpectedly, not proximately caused by any negligence on his part,
and which to a reasonable person requires immediate action without
time for deliberation, his conduct in such an emergency is not negli-
126. Id. at 282.
127. Id.
128. 567 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. Id. at 557-58. But see Great W. Loan & Trust Co. v. Rodriguez, 290 S.W.2d 551
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1956, no writ).
130. 568 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ filed).
131. Id. at 902. The complementary instruction advised the jury that:
The law requires a driver on University Drive, facing a steady red signal at
Alice Street, to stop before entering the intersection and to remain standing
until a signal light indication to proceed is shown, except that after so stop-
pin, he may turn right, after standing until it would appear to a person using
ordinary care that the intersection may be entered safely and after yielding the
right-of-way to other vehicles.
Id.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272 (Vernon 1967).
133. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272; see Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 36 TEX. B.J. 495 (1973).
134. TEX. R. Crv. P. 277.
135. 565 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1978).
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gence or a failure to use a high degree of care, if, after such emergency
arises, he acts as a very cautious, competent, and prudent person
would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. 36
Ruling that the phraseology of the instruction, prefaced by the word
"when," conveyed to the jury the trial court's opinion that such an emer-
gency existed, the court of civil appeals concluded that the instruction con-
stituted a comment on the weight of the evidence. 3 7 Disagreeing, the
supreme court specifically approved the definition of sudden emergency,
concluding that "[tlhe employment of the word 'when' in the instruction
does not indicate a statement by the judge as to the existence of a sudden
emergency" because "[i]n common parlance and ordinary usage the word
'when' is frequently employed as an equivalent to the word 'if.' 9138
Although rule 277 allows the trial court to "submit an issue disjunctively
where it is apparent from the evidence that one or the other of the condi-
tions or facts inquired about necessarily exist,"' 39 Warren v. Denison 140
held that the two conditions inquired about must be mutually exclusive.
In Warren an issue was submitted to the jury, inquiring both whether the
dwelling in question was not built by the contractor (1) in a workmanlike
manner "and/or" of good materials and (2) in accordance with the appli-
cable plans "and/or" the construction contract between the parties, fol-
lowed by two possible answers, "It was" and "It was not."'' 6 Noting that
the form of the submission foreclosed identification of the condition found
by the jury to have existed, the Amarillo court of civil appeals, following
an earlier case, 4 2 concluded that "the choices are not mutually exclusive"
and "the rule only authorizes disjunctive submission," not both "conjunc-
tive and disjunctive."' 143
General Motors Corp. v. Turner,' 44 a divided opinion of the Beaumont
court of civil appeals, may be the source of "tax relief" for a defendant
facing the prospect of a jury award against him for damages in a personal
injury case. The trial court in Turner refused a request by the defendants
that the jury be given an instruction indicating that any award of damages
was not subject to federal taxation. From an adverse verdict, the defend-
ants appealed. Following an earlier decision of the supreme court,' 45 a
majority of the court of civil appeals held that such a submission was im-
proper because it would introduce a wholly collateral matter into the dam-
age issue."4 The dissent advocated a more realistic approach in this era of
136. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
137. Moore v. Citran, 559 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), rev'd, 565
S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1978).
138. 565 S.W.2d at 45.
139. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (emphasis added).
140. 563 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
141. Id. at 302-03.
142. Parker v. Keyser, 540 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
143. 563 S.W.2d at 304-05 (emphasis in original).
144. 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ granted).
145. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956).
146. 567 S.W.2d at 822. But see Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 295-97
(9th Cir. 1975).
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increasingly large verdicts, arguing in favor of the requested submission in
order to dispel any misapprehension and to avoid any confusion that
might affect jurors attempting to award damages. 147 The question may be
re-examined in the near future as the supreme court has granted an appli-
cation for writ of error.'
48
XII. JURY PRACTICE
Mendoza v. Varon,'49 a case involving personal injuries caused by al-
leged malpractice by the defendant physician in treating the plaintiffs mi-
nor daughter, presented a question of first impression in Texas. The trial
court excluded evidence that the defendant and one of his expert witnesses,
also a physician, were insured by the same insurance company. On appeal
the plaintiff argued that this exclusion violated the rule that facts showing
interest on the part of a witness are admissible even though they disclose
that the defendant may be protected by insurance.' 5 0 Conceding "that a
large judgment against any doctor will probably affect the insurance rates
of other physicians," the court of civil appeals nevertheless concluded that
"this interest is remote, and any proof of bias based upon that interest is
outweighed by the prejudice caused by informing the jury of the defend-
ant's insurance protection."' 5'
The propriety of a final argument in a worker's compensation case was
considered by the court in Reese v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. 152 Coun-
sel for the defendant had argued that the plaintiffs attorney had concocted
a "sham or plot" to make his client's claim more valuable, requiring the
plaintiff to contact "a thousand doctors" before he found one who would
cooperate in the "combination" by providing unnecessary treatment and
inflating the plaintiffs medical bills.'53 Observing that no evidence ad-
duced at the trial supported any of these assertions, the court concluded
that the argument was prejudicial and probably caused the rendition of an
improper judgment. Since the argument was also found to be incurable
the court further held that the plaintiff did not waive the error by failing to
object to it promptly and to request an appropriate jury instruction on the
point. ' 54
The juror lacking in mathematical acumen will be glad to know that one
case during the survey period concluded that the use of an electronic cal-
culator to determine damages during jury deliberations does not constitute
147. 567 S.W.2d at 822-23.
148. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 23 (Oct. 14, 1978).
149. 563 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ retd n.r.e.).
150. See South Tex. Nat. Gas Gathering Co. v. Guerra, 469 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Barton Plumbing Co. v. Johnson, 285 S.W.2d
780 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1956, writ ref'd); Aguileva v. Reynolds Well Serv., Inc., 234
S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, writ retd).
151. 563 S.W.2d at 649.
152. 567 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ granted).
153. Id. at 862.





In order to keep pace with rising interest rates, the Texas Legislature
amended article 5069 in 1975 to provide that "[a]ll judgments of the courts
of this State shall bear interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum from
and after the date of the judgment." 56 Focusing on amended article 5069,
the Texas Supreme Court was recently faced with the question whether the
amendment applies to a judgment rendered before the effective date of the
change so as to authorize the accrual of interest at the new rate from the
date of the amendment. 5 7 Answering in the negative, the court concluded
that the increased rate of interest should be applied only to judgments en-
tered after the effective date of the amendment. 58
Rule 306a, 59 which governs the entry of judgments, provides that the
time allowed for perfecting an appeal commences when the trial judge
signs the judgment. Confronted with a situation in which the date of the
signing of a decree was uncertain due to the wording used, the supreme
court seized the opportunity to advocate reform in this area.16° The court
cautioned that the word "Entered" employed by many form books, "is
synonymous with neither 'Signed' nor 'Rendered,'" admonishing that
"[law professors should teach, writers of legal form books should so cor-
rect their books, lawyers should so draft documents, and judges should
make certain that above the signature on each judgment or order there are
the words: 'Signed this - day of -, 19-.' ,161
It is well settled in Texas that a nunc pro tunc order may be entered at
any time by the trial court to correct a "clerical error" in an earlier judg-
ment.' 62 Since "judicial error" in a judgment is not subject to correction
after the expiration of thirty days from the judgment's entry, Texas courts
are frequently called upon to distinguish between judicial and clerical er-
rors. 163 Mathes v. Kelton "6  was one such instance. The plaintiff in
155. Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Goldstein, 567 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
156. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
157. Manley v. Sammons Enterprises, Inc., 563 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1978); Coastal Indus.
Water Auth. v. Trinity Portland Cement Div., General Portland Cement Co., 563 S.W.2d
916 (Tex. 1978).
158. 563 S.W.2d at 920; 563 S.W.2d at 918-19.
159. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
160. Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1978). The order indicated that a hear-
ing on a motion for nonsuit was held on Jan. 20, 1977, but did not indicate when the judge
signed the order ruling on the motion. Id. at 383.
161. Id. at 384.
162. See generally 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.08.1 (F. Elliott rev.
1971); Reavley & Orr, Trial Court's Power to Amend Its Judgments, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 191
(1973).
163. See, e.g., Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1973); Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 471 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1971); Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.
1968); Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 257 S.W.2d 289 (1953); Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29,
285 S.W. 1079 (1926); Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).
164. 569 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1978).
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Mathes brought suit for the return of a diamond ring held by the defend-
ant, and the defendant asserted a crossaction for recovery on a promissory
note executed by the plaintiff and for foreclosure on the ring. At the con-
clusion of a nonjury trial, the trial court orally rendered judgment award-
ing recovery on the note in favor of the defendant but directing that the
ring be returned to the plaintiff. A written judgment consistent with the
oral pronouncements was subsequently prepared and signed. More than
thirty days later, the trial judge, purporting to correct a clerical error, en-
tered a nunc pro tunc judgment awarding the defendant foreclosure upon
the ring, observing that he had "always intended" for the defendant to be
able to foreclose on the ring.'65 Disapproving this action, the supreme
court noted that there was no variance between the ruling rendered orally
and the judgment as originally signed despite the later statement by the
trial judge. Observing that the judgment nunc pro tunc "materially al-
tered" the substance of the original judgment, the supreme court held that
"[t]he change constituted the correction of a judicial error which cannot be
validly accomplished by a judgment nunc pro tunc."'' 66
XIV. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In Scheffer v. Chron 167 the Beaumont court of civil appeals reiterated
that the negligence, inadvertence, or mistake of trial counsel is attributable
to his client and the resulting failure of counsel to defend the case or prop-
erly develop the available evidence does not constitute a sufficient basis
upon which a motion for new trial can be granted.
XV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
As a result of amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which
became effective January 1, 1976, 16 an appeal is now perfected by filing a
bond or cash deposit securing costs on appeal within thirty days after ren-
dition of the judgment or order overruling a motion for new trial.169 The
transcript and statement of facts still must be filed within sixty days from
the rendition of judgment or order overruling motion for new trial,' 70 un-
less the time is extended pursuant to rule 21c. 17 ' Rule 21c, which was
enacted to liberalize the requirements for obtaining extensions of time on
165. Id. at 877.
166. Id. at 878. Nevertheless, since a timely motion for new trial and amendment thereto
was filed by the defendant following the entry of the original judgment, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court retained jurisdiction over the matter until thirty days after the
amended motion for new trial was overruled and thus had plenary power to reverse, modify,
or vacate its judgment at the time the judgment nunc pro tunc was entered. For that reason,
the court held that the later judgment was valid. d
167. 560 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Seegener-
ally Petro-Chemical Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1974); Reynolds v.
Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1094-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, writ
ref'd).
168. See Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 38 TEX. B.J. 823 (1975).





appeal, 7 2 provides:
(1) An extension of time may be granted for late filing in a court
of civil appeals of a transcript, statement of facts, motion for rehear-
ing, or application to the supreme court for writ of error, if a motion
reasonably explaining the need therefor is filed within fifteen (15) days
of the last date for filing as prescribed by the applicable rule or
rules. 113
The "reasonable explanation" requirement of rule 21 c, which had been the
subject of two divergent views, 174 was authoritatively construed by the
supreme court in Meshwert v. Meshwert.175 "'[R]easonably explaining,'"
according to the court, means "any plausible statement of circumstances
indicating that failure to file within the sixty-day period was not deliberate
or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake or mis-
chance." 1
76
Demonstrating the liberality of the "reasonably explaining" standard
announced in Meshwert, the Beaumont court of civil appeals recently
granted a motion under rule 21c when the appellant had waited until the
fifty-ninth day of the allotted sixty-day period to request a transcript and
statement of facts. The court found an explanation by the appellant's
counsel that "the delay was the result of a mistake in his calculations" to
be sufficient under the rule.'7 7 Nevertheless, while rule 21c reflects a more
liberal attitude toward extending the time for filing a transcript, statement
of fact, motion for rehearing, or application for writ of error, Smith v.
Dreyer178 demonstrates that the rule does not authorize an extension of the
thirty-day period allowed for filing a bond or other deposit securing costs
on appeal. 1 The court in Smith stated that such an appellate step was
jurisdictional and could not be extended for any reason."'
While rule 35481 stipulates that a cost bond in the sum of $500 is suffi-
cient to perfect an appeal, it also provides that "[ulpon motion of either
172. See Figari, supra note 24, at 309-10.
173. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c (emphasis added).
174. Compare Cinemas Sw., Inc. v. Jeffries, 550 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1977, no writ); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Stricklin, 547 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Hildyard v. Fannel Studio, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ.
App.--Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.
Civ. App-Beaumont 1976), aft'd, 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977); Gallegos v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 539S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ); Mulfoy v. Mulloy, 538
S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); and Stieler v,
Stieler, 537 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); with City of Wichita
Falls v. Hollis, 539 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); and
Sloan v. Passman, 536 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
175. 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977).
176. Id. at 384.
177. Scheffer v. Chron, 560 S.W.2d 419, 420-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ
refd n.r.e.).
178. 572 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
179. Id. at 359.
180. Id.; accord, B & M Mach. Co. v. Avionic Enterprises, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 558, 559
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana), rev'don other grounds, 566 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1978); see Glid-
den Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 Tex. 591, 291 S.W.2d 315 (1956).
181. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354.
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party the court may increase or decrease the amount of the bond or deposit
required."' 82 Focusing on this provision and observing that rule 356183
requires that the bond be filed within thirty days after rendition of judg-
ment or the overruling of a motion for new trial, the court in Fine v.
Page ' 4 observed that "the appeal is perfected when the appellant files a
bond in the amount of $500, regardless of whether it is approved by the
District Clerk, unless the trial court, upon motion of either party, fixes a
different amount."'815 The court invalidated an order increasing a cost
bond that had been entered by the trial court over thirty days after the
overruling of the appellant's motion for new trial, holding that "a trial
court's action to increase or decrease the amount of the bond required to
perfect appeal after the expiration of the thirty day period is of no effect"
and that "[a]fter the expiration of the thirty day period, an attack of the
sufficiency of the bond can be brought solely in the appellate court."''
86
Young v. Hicks187 is a reminder that reversal on appeal does not neces-
sarily require a new trial of the entire case. The plaintiffs in Young sought
an injunction requiring the defendant to remove two fences he had built
along his property line that extended to the center of, and interfered with
plaintiffs' use of, a certain road. At the conclusion of the trial the jury
found that the road had become public and that the defendant had erected
the fences in order to harass the plaintiffs; the trial court, therefore, issued
an injunction requiring the defendant to move the fences. On appeal the
court of civil appeals reversed and remanded on all issues because the in-
junction failed to establish the specific location of the road. 8 8 Although
agreeing that the injunction failed to meet the applicable requirements of
specificity, the supreme court concluded that a general remand of the case
was unwarranted. Under rule 434, which governs the disposition by the
appellate court if a judgment is reversed on appeal, "if it appears to the
court that the error affects a part only of the matter in controversy and that
such part is clearly separable without unfairness to the parties, the judg-
ment shall only be reversed and a new trial ordered as to that part affected
by such error."'8 9 Relying upon rule 434, the supreme court ordered a
limited remand, holding that "[tjhe location issue is separable from the
other issues in the case and the parties will not be harmed by limiting the
trial on remand to this issue."' 9
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 377, which governs the preparation and
filing of the statement of facts on appeal, states that "[it shall be unneces-
sary for the statement of facts to be approved by the trial court or judge
182. Id. 354(a).
183. Id. 356.
184. 572 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
185. Id. at 578.
186. Id. at 579.
187. 559 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam).
188. Hicks v. Young, 553 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), afdinpart, rev'd in part,
559 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam).
189. TEX. R. Civ. P. 434.
190. 559 S.W.2d at 344.
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thereof when agreed to by the parties," but "[i]f any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, . . . the
matter shall be submitted to and settled by the trial court or judge thereof
and the statement of facts shall be by him made to conform to the
truth."'' In Texas Hauling Contractors Corp. v. Rose Sales Co. 192 the
court was faced with a motion to strike the statement of facts because it
was signed by the trial judge but not by counsel for the parties. Thus, the
court was obliged to decide whether rule 377 permits authentication of
such statement by the trial judge when the parties have not attempted to
agree as to its correctness. Adding to an existing conflict among the deci-
sions of the courts of civil appeals, 193 the court overruled the motion to
strike in favor of the more liberal approach. 94 While observing that "[t]he
clear intent of Rule 377(d) is to avoid the necessity of asking judges to
review statements of fact except in instances where disagreement between
the parties needs to be resolved" and "that attorneys should be encouraged
to follow this procedure," the court held that "when time or circumstances
seems to require the prior approval by the trial judge," there is "no need
for enforcing strong sanctions against the appellant just because the parties
do not approve the statement of facts prior to filing in the appellate
court." 195
XVI.' MISCELLANEOUS
Article 2226,196 which authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney's
fees in connection with the successful prosecution of certain types of
claims, formerly limited such recovery to instances in which the creditor
"should finally obtain judgment."' 97 Because several cases 198 construing
former article 2226 had concluded that a debtor could avoid liability for
attorney's fees thereunder by paying the amount of the claim after the
191. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(d).
192. 565 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ filed).
193. Compare Wells-Grinnan M.A.B. v. Belton Sand & Gravel Co., 293 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1956, no writ), and Newsom v. Boyd, 203 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1947, no writ), with St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lake Livingston Proper-
ties, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.), and Foster v.
Buchele, 213 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ refd n.r.e.). See Roberson
Farm Equip. Co. v. Hill, 514 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Sparks v. Chandler, 201 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1947, no writ).
194. 565 S.W.2d at 242-43; see Roberson Farm Equip. Co. v. Hill, 514 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
195. Id. at 243.
196. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
197. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 225, § i, at 1073. See generally Johnson, Article 2226 Re-
visited- Penetrating the Jurisdictional Labyrinth, 40 TEX. B.J. 395 (1977).
198. Johnson-Walker Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Lane Container, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 500
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Villarreal v. Wennermark, 540 S.W.2d
528 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ); Lamb v. Payne, 405 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1966, writ dism'd); Gulf Coast Operators, Inc. v. Fleming Oil Co., 393
S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, no writ); National Homes Corp. v. C.J. Bldgs.,
Inc., 393 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ dism'd). But see Boaz Well Serv.,
Inc. v. Carter, 437 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, no writ). See generally
Huff v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 158 Tex. 433, 312 S.W.2d 493 (1958).
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creditor has engaged an attorney and filed suit but prior to the rendition of
judgment, the language "should finally obtain judgment" was recently de-
leted from the statute.'99 Giving the change full effect, the court of civil
appeals in Enriquez v. K & D Development & Construction, Inc. 2  observed
that article 2226 "now provides for recovery of attorney's fees if at the
expiration of thirty days after presentment, 'payment for the just amount
owing has not been tendered' " and that to " 'finally obtain judgment' is no
longer a requirement in the Statute."
In Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc.201 the question
presented was whether a trial court has the plenary power to vacate a judg-
ment while an amended motion for new trial is pending before the court.
In this action the trial court had vacated the original judgment more than
thirty days after it was rendered, but within the forty-five days from the
time the amended motion for new trial had been filed. Relying on Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 329b, section 5,202 the Texas Supreme Court
stated that the trial court retained plenary power over its judgment until
thirty days after the amended motion for new trial is overruled. Thus, the
court concluded that since the amended motion for a new trial was still
pending, the judgment was timely vacated by the trial court.2 °3
In the area of collateral estoppel by judgment, Olivarez v. Broadway
Hardware, Inc. 204 and Baker v. Story,205 following in the footsteps of an
earlier case,2°6 concluded that mutuality of parties is no longer required in
Texas for application of that doctrine.
199. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) with 1971
Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 225, § 1, at 1073.
200. 567 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. 567 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1978).
202. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(5).
203. 567 S.W.2d at 800.
204. 564 S.W.2d 195, 200-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. 564 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
206. Hardy v. Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See generally Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Companion Mexicana v. Jernigan, 410 F.2d
718, 727-28 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969).
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